Andy Shane, January 23, 1999

In his First, Second, and Sixth Meditations, Descartes outlines and carries out part of his plan in search of the indubitable. With the proposal of an "evil genius" and the noted fallibility of the senses, he casts potential doubt on virtually all fundamental knowledge (Meditation I). Then he proposes that the only knowable fundamental truth is the fact that "I" exist (Meditation II). Finally, after systematically building up higher-level indubitable truths from that fundamental, he details the differences and interactions between the mind and body (Meditation VI). His discussion is classic and valuable, but is not without an abundance of critics.

Descartes' First Meditation explains his plan in pursuit of knowable truths. His systematic breakdown of the set of things he previously claimed to know is typical and substantiated. In the final paragraph of the section, he comes down to what he believes is a necessary consideration in the search for some fundamental knowable truth(s) - he supposes the existence of an evil deceiver who may potentially deceive him in everything he appears to observe and think about. His consideration of this is valid and necessary, however I might point out one fault. The mere fact that he continues optimistically in his pursuits after the considerations in this section shows his implicit belief that he is not being deceived in his current or future deliberations on the matter. This simple fact seems to contradict the very essence of this meditation.

The Second Meditation continues to address the issues of evil deception in body and mind, and aims primarily to draw the conclusion that although at this point the existence of the body apparently cannot be known, the existence of the self (which is later equated with the mind) can. This is based on Descartes' belief: "I think that I am something." Furthermore, he proposes the apparent tautological necessity of one of two possibilities - the first is that he is correct in that thought, and the second that he is being evilly deceived in the thought. Naturally, both cases indicate the conclusion that he does indeed exist, for (conveniently) even in order to be deceived one needs to exist. This is a classic and enormously intuitive step at first glance. However, some may claim that depending on what sense it is presented in, it may be problematic or impotent since the language of "I think…" presupposes the existence of "I" in itself.

The Sixth Meditation is more elaborative and (some may say) less air-tight than the first two. Descartes first sets out that because he has reason only to believe in his thinking self, and has no basis for belief in his body or any other corporeal objects, that the soul is what he is and is distinct from and can exist without his corporeal body. He then holds simply that since it appears that his thoughts of corporeal objects are caused by corporeal objects and that God as a good being does not deceive him, that corporeal objects indeed exist roughly as they appear. He also acknowledges the interaction of the mind and body in that when he feels pain (in his mind), his body is being adversely affected, for example. Finally, after noting (possibly incorrectly) that corporeal objects can be divided infinitely, and that the mind is completely indivisible that they are made of two distinct "types of stuff." This basically outlines the fundamental points of his interactionist dualist position. Various objections may be raised toward his reasoning and bases in this section, but it is admirable and worthy of serious consideration nonetheless.

---------------

Descartes, Rene. Meditations on First Philosophy (Meditations I, II, and VI), from Morick, Harold, ed. Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind. 1970: Scott Foresman, Glenview, IL.